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ABSTRACT 
In the wake of high profile and recent events of blatant privacy violations, which also raise issues of 
democratic accountability as well as, at least potentially, undermining the legitimacy of current local 
and international governance arrangements, a rethinking of the justification of the right to privacy is 
proposed. In this paper, the case of the violation of the privacy of a bullied autistic youngster and the 
consequent prosecution of 3 Google executives will be discussed first. We will then analyse the 
arguments made by both academic experts and pundits who agree with Google’s claim that if the first 
sentence had been left unchallenged, it would have opened the floodgates to several other jurisdictions 
that would as a consequence have used it as a pretext to increase control on the internet, jeopardising 
in such a way free speech, which has been seen so far as an inalienable right which should not be 
censored. Finally, by going beyond the sentences and their immediate contexts, we will propose a 
theoretical justification of our analysis. Our main claim is that the value of the right to privacy is 
based on the argument that its violation would undermine citizens’ capacity to participate effectively 
in democratic politics. 
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RESUMO 
Na esteira dos recentes e importantes eventos de flagrantes violações da privacidade, é proposto um 
repensar da justificativa do direito à privacidade, pois tais violações levantam questões de 
responsabilidade democrática e, ao menos potencialmente, contribuem para corroer a legitimidade 
das atuais organizações de governança locais e internacionais. Neste artigo, discutir-se-á 
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primeiramente o caso da violação da privacidade de um jovem autista intimidado (bullied) e o 
consequente julgamento de três executivos do Google. Depois, serão analisados os argumentos dos 
especialistas, acadêmicos ou não, que concordam com a afirmação do Google de que, se a primeira 
sentença não tivesse sido contestada, as comportas para várias outras jurisdições teriam sido abertas 
e, como consequência, serviriam como pretexto para aumentar o controle na internet, comprometendo 
a liberdade de expressão enquanto direito inalienável que não deveria ser censurado. Por fim, além 
das sentenças e dos seus contextos imediatos, propõe-se uma justificativa teórica da análise exposta. 
O principal argumento consiste no valor do direito à privacidade estar baseado na leitura de que sua 
violação prejudicaria a capacidade dos cidadãos de participar efetivamente da política democrática. 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE 
Jurisprudência. Direitos humanos e democracia. Cyberdireito, ética e governança. Privacidade vs 
liberdade de expressão. Direitos legais e constitucionais. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In view of perceived regulation shortcomings, self-regulation as an alternative to Regulated 
Self-Governance (Andresani and Ferlie 2006; see also Knill and Tosun 2012) has been seen as a 
response both more effective and flexible. According to the literature, the growth and increasing 
liberalisation of international trade combined with the development of capital markets has resulted in 
a sort of ‘governance deficit’ (Newell, 2002). If trade and capital liberalisation are to be seen as 
important indicators of economic globalisation, with implications for business regulation and 
corporate governance (see Dignam and Galanis, 2008), CSR–induced initiatives have been 
considered as the remaining alternative in such a governance void, flexible enough to accommodate 
different jurisdictional and cultural contexts. In discussing the contribution of International Business 
Law and Ethics to business-governance issues under conditions of globalisation, the case of Internet 
Providers is particularly revealing. The recent Vividown case will be examined in order to assess if 
self-regulation and ‘light’ (Network) Governance is and should always be the right regulatory 
approach (Andresani and Ferlie 2006, Ferlie, Musselin and Andresani 2012). In fact, the prosecution 
of 3 Google executives for the delay in removing from their Italian site a video portraying an autistic 
youngster being bullied has interesting implications for the debate on the influence of formal and 
informal institutions on organisational behaviour. As Le Menestrel et al. (2002) have shown regarding 
a similar case, Yahoo! did not see fit to remedy the problems indicated by the activists, revealing a 
different understanding of freedom of expression which reflects different institutionally-embedded 
social expectations. Similarly, in the Google-Vividown case, only after the Italian courts intervened 
the internet provider giant started to address issues of e-ethics (e.g. Kafka, 2010). The problem is 
quite thorny. On the one hand, modern communications networks, including Internet, seem to use the 
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same expressions and the same type of ‘hate speech’. In this perspective, technologies assume, in 
general, the aspects of ‘mere tool’ to spread already entrenched biases and prejudices (such as 
homophobic and racist speech). On the other hand, networks facilitate the manifestation of hate 
speech. In this latter case, Internet is not only a tool, but it is able to act as a sort of ‘multiplier’ by 
expanding and stimulating new and old types of behaviour thanks to specific psychological 
mechanisms (‘crowd effects, ‘distance’ etc). So, Internet is not ‘neutral’, but it contributes to create 
an environment in which inhibitory mechanisms are lowered (Ziccardi 2016, see also Andresani and 
Stamile 2018). 
In this paper, we will use both arguments and narratives (Andresani and Ward forthcoming) 
to show that the case has wider implications not only for comparative institutional analysis (cf. Doh 
and Guay, 2006; Matten and Moon, 2004), but also for legal and philosophical reflections. 
 
1 BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 
 
The Vividown case is about an incriminated video that shows an autistic student being 
bullied by a few teenagers amongst the indifference of other schoolmates in a secondary school in 
Turin. The disabled teenager is seen subjected to psychological and physical harassment: objects are 
thrown at him and as a consequence his glasses drop on the floor. He is portrayed bending and looking 
for them while a student insults him as well a voluntary association (Vividown, from which comes 
the name of the case and which deals with disabled persons affected by Downs Syndrome) in a mock 
phone call. Another student is seen recording and a third one drawing an ‘SS’ sign on the blackboard 
and with the arm raised in the Roman salute. The video was recorded at the end of May 2006, 
uploaded onto Google Video on September 8th and remained available online until November 7th 
before being removed (see Repubblica, 2010). The video became highly ranked in the “funny video” 
category, reaching more than five thousand downloads. Through the use of Google Ad-Words 
services, some specific terms began to be associated with the video: advertising posts thus appeared 
beside the images. An act of violence and crude disrespect thus apparently turned into a business 
affair. More precisely the video had a duration of about 3 minutes and at certain point it was possible 
to listen the Italian offensive expression: “mongolo”, normally used to indicate people affected by 
Down Syndrome. (See: Sentenza di primo grado, Sentenza n. 1972/2010. Tribunale Ordinario di 
Milano in composizione monocratica. Sezione 4 Penale). 
Three Google executives were prosecuted for violation of the Italian law on privacy while 
being cleared together with another regional marketing manager of the defamation (libel) charge on 
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February 24th 2010. This first sentence caused strong reactions. A Google representative stated that 
they would appeal against the sentence, as they did, because it was a threat against freedom of 
expression. The American ambassador in Rome also expressed his uneasiness with the sentence based 
on similar arguments. 
 
2 SECOND AND THIRD SENTENCES 
 
A different view was that of the court of second instance, in 2012. In fact, its decision 
completely overturned the previous judgment by pointing out that: “Art. 167 of Legislative Decree n. 
196 of 2003 does not refer to the previous article n. 13 and, therefore, does not require the Internet 
provider to inform the user about the existence and content of the privacy laws. In fact, any violation 
of the cited art. 13” refers “not to art. 167, but art. 161” (cf. Corte di Appello of Milan, December 21, 
2012). The key point is that the Corte di Appello decided to exclude the existence (dolo specifico) as 
it was attributed to the defendants in the previous sentence1. The obligation to provide information 
rests therefore on the uploader, and not on the third party2. In fact, the Court said that the specific 
intent may not “be considered as coinciding with the end of profit” because art. 167 “postulates the 
necessary psychological intentional participation […] to achieve a profit” (cf. Corte di Appello of 
Milan, December 21, 2012). But, beyond the enthusiasm that followed the acquittal, this second 
sentence raised many controversies, which were fuelled even more by the judgment of the Suprema 
Corte di Cassazione, III sezione penale, n. 3672, whose sentence was filed on February 3, 2014. 
In this last sentence, the judges did not depart from the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and 
stated that the hosting provider would not be able to monitor all content uploaded to the network. To 
sum up, in the final sentence the court considered the second sentence as justified, after having 
analysed every point raised in the appeal. So, the internet hosting provider, according to article 16 of 
Legislative Decree n. 70 of 2003, “has no control over the storing of data […], since the data are 
entirely attributable to the user receiving the service as he (or she) uploads them on the platform 
placed at his disposal” (cf. Corte di Appello of Milan, December 21, 2012). 
The internet hosting provider, then, would not be liable for storing information at the request 
of the recipient of a service if two conditions occur: first, that the provider does not have knowledge 
of illegal activity or information. Second, that as soon as it was made aware of the illegality, upon 
 
1 Regarding the technical aspects of dolo specifico and dolo eventuale see Mantovani (2013) and Fiandaca and Musco 
(2010). Note also that in this article all translations from Italian are ours. 
2 See art. 167 of Legislative Decree n. 196 of the 2003 Privacy Code. 
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notice by the competent authorities, the provider did act immediately to remove the data. Thus, 
Google Video, as a mere instrument, was considered as a simple platform where the person 
responsible is the one who uploaded data on it3. This interpretation of the Corte di Cassazione would 
seem to comply with that affirmed in the European Directive 2000/31/CE and article 17 of the 
Legislative Decree 70 of 2003 (the Electronic Commerce Code) “that excludes […] a general 
obligation to monitor the information transmitted or stored, and a general obligation to seek actively 
any crimes”4. This element should be identified as “the point of balance between the freedom of the 
provider and the protection of persons who eventually may be damaged by making available the 
information5. This last sentence also raised strong reactions. 
 
3 ANALYSIS OF THE CASE 
 
This case is relevant for several reasons. First, because several pundits agreed with Google’s 
argument about the attack to free speech involved in this case (Whitcomb, 2010). It is also important 
to point out that the judge of the first trial, in justifying the sentence focused on (the breach of) the 
right to privacy, which is protected by the Italian law, apparently gave priority to it in his judgement 
vis-à-vis freedom of expression6. So what to make of this case? Who is right: Google or the Italian 
judge of the first court?7 The striking characteristic of this case is that it has several implications 
which go well beyond those specific to the first sentence and its immediate context. 
 
4 THE SPECIFICITY OF THE INTERNET  
 
Google executives find themselves in the unlikely position of being heralded as the paladins 
of free speech and human rights, and the Italian judge and prosecutors of the first court as medieval 
witch-hunters trapped in an antediluvian ideology8. We will consider the details of the case in the 
next section, but here we just want to indicate that it is not surprising that blogs and media reacted 
through vivid stories as well as arguments in such a strong manner, to the extent that the New York 
Times claimed that “(t)he verdict, though subject to appeal, could have sweeping implications 
 
3 Cf. Corte di Appello of Milan. 
4 Ibidem. 
5 Ivi, 11. See also Court of Justice regarding Case C-131/12. Ivi, 12. 
6 Tribunale di Milano, 12 April 2010 n. 1972. 
7 In this article our focus is primarily on the arguments and narratives regarding the first sentence. 
8 This must also be seen in the context of the controversies on Streetview and Buzz: see e.g. Guardian, (2010); Barber 
and Palmer (2010). 
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worldwide for Internet freedom” (Donadio, 2010). Judge Oscar Magi in an interview complained that 
he had even received threats and insults via email and on his Facebook pages9. In fact, what could be 
more threatening than an assault on the virtual agora? As Google stated in their blog, the ruling in the 
first sentence “attacks the very principles of freedom on which the Internet is built” (Googleblog, 
2010). The main argument is that internet is a new medium, self-regulating and intrinsically 
democratic: surely any attempt to transpose the old ways of thinking (including old ethical arguments) 
to a fundamentally new technology and medium is to be judged at best as naïve and at worst as 
authoritarian. Technological innovation creates new possibilities for human action, the argument 
goes, which poses entirely new questions and ethical issues. Oscar Magi clearly states in motivating 
the 3 six-month suspended sentences for violation of privacy that the internet instead “is not a 
borderless grassland where everything is allowed and nothing is forbidden” (Tribunale di Milano, 12 
April 2010 n.1972, p. 98). This is the first ethical issue to be addressed: is the internet something 
fundamentally new which requires new ethical principles and arguments or not? 
It is possible to find support for both positions in the literature on internet and e-ethics. There 
is no doubt that new issues and an entire field (computer and/or internet ethics) has emerged because 
the internet is indeed a new medium and technology. It is apparent that the internet revolution revolves 
around a specific novelty: users of the internet can express their opinion for the first time without 
intermediaries. That was and still is not possible for users of other media such as newspapers or TV 
programmes. As a consequence, how can internet (service and/or content) providers (IPs) be held 
legally and morally liable in the same way as editors of newspapers or TV programmes are? This is 
a big issue and if anything the Vividown case has at the very least inspired a much needed debate. 
The first aspect is: is it technically feasible to control the contents put on the space that providers 
make available? The second: should IPs such as Google control them? 
As Oscar Magi explains in the first sentence10, by indexing the content of the videos, 
notwithstanding their denial, Google is technically able to do that: the very way AdWords works is 
based on the fact that it is possible to examine contents. This is how Google is able to make profits: 
the ads that appear after a user has carried out her search are linked to the content of the results of the 
search. From clicking on the ads, Google has been able to exploit commercially what at first was seen 
as an unprofitable enterprise11. There is also no doubt that Google is able to filter and therefore 
examine the content, as they have admitted during the Chinese debacle (Smith, 2009 and Brenkert, 
 
9 Sole24, (2010). 
10 Cf. Tribunale di Milano § 9, 62 ff. 
11 Ivi, 63-64. 
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2009). In the sentence, it is even suggested that just a check on the title of the incriminated video 
would have sufficed to spot its problematic content, because it contained offensive language and hate 
speech. Other suggestions can be extrapolated by examining the number of hits that videos have: the 
higher the number of hits, the more appropriate it would be to check (manually) its content. As a 
matter of fact, the video was widely viewed, it was ranked first of the funniest videos list as well as 
being ranked amongst those most clicked. Still, this is a controversial issue: Google and other internet 
providers can operate by relying on automating as many as possible of their operations (Edwards, 
2010). They have built their commercial success on that. The more they rely on manual processes 
(i.e. involving human scrutiny), the less profitable they are. It seems (and this is the argument of 
Oscar Magi and the Italian prosecutors in the first trial) that it is indeed technically feasible. So since 
it is technically possible to control contents, would it be ethically appropriate (Donadio, 2010)? 
We have to turn now to the specificity of e-ethics. This is another contested topic, and we 
will use the case again as a way to shed lights on some of the issues involved. After having admitted 
(as we did above) the novelty of the internet, the next step would be to consider how we should 
address the ethical issues it raises. Shall we throw away all old principles, values and arguments and 
start a new when we address issues of e-ethics? We agree with Deborah Johnson (2001) on giving a 
genus-species account. The novelty of the internet (and the field of computer or e-ethics) requires that 
we address these new issues by drawing analogies from old or, more correctly, different areas, where 
principles and arguments proved to be appropriate and indeed useful. Computer and internet ethics 
issues should be approached as new species of familiar (generic) moral issues. This meta-ethical 
claim is based on the denial of technological determinism: i.e. the assumption that (new) technology 
cannot impact on us in such a way as to create an entirely new ethical landscape. We cannot even 
recognise an ethical problem as such unless we are able to connect it to familiar ethical concepts and 
issues. The case put an emphasis on the question if there are situations which we would categorise as 
unethical in familiar circumstances, but that should not be judged as such in virtual conditions. Hate 
speech and especially harassment are (known to be) not acceptable in familiar situations, why should 
they be accepted on the internet? 
Let’s assume (and we do assume that) that it is not acceptable (but this is not universally 
agreed), then what should be done about it? Should we censure the internet? The implication of not 
accepting harassment on the internet is that some form of control should be put in place. A similar 
case of cyberbullying caused outrage in Australia, where Facebook pages set up in tribute of two 
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murdered children were inundated with pornography and obscenities12. Facebook’s reply to the strong 
criticisms (coming also from political quarters) about the fact that they allowed that outrage to happen 
was the standard one which was also to be relied upon in the Vividown: that the net is able to self-
regulate. As soon as they receive(d) notice (from other internet users) a (the) problematic content is 
(was) quickly removed. But what if that doesn’t not happen quickly? After all, in the case we are 
examining here the video was publicly available for two months. One could argue that after about a 
month users did manifest their disgust by writing comments below the video in the comments section. 
Assuming that there is a technically feasible way of spotting and removing the content quickly after 
the notice has been received (as argued above, whether by using an automatic or manual procedure), 
still users did not ventilate their unease for about a month. Moreover, the video was indeed removed 
quickly (within hours of being notified), but the only notification that Google paid attention to was 
the one they received by the Italian police following the charge made before them by Vividown 
(which for the Corte di Appello and Corte di Cassazione was enough). If anything, the case shows 
that self-regulation might not always work. The case rightly indicates that internet providers should 
address the issue instead of ignoring it otherwise the internet as we have known it so far could indeed 
be under threat. 
Let’s now address the issue of when, if ever, should content be controlled: before or after 
being made available on the net? Before answering the question it is necessary to look briefly into 
the technical aspects again. Solutions to the problem can indeed be found, such as improving the 
flagging system: i.e. there should be no need to register to flag a content as inappropriate (as it was 
required by YouTube) because this might put users off and as a result Google should invest in units 
staffed by employees who would quickly check notices and remove contents if inappropriate. Once 
a feasible solution has been found, our view is that it is much more problematic to rely on preventive 
control. It would bring us back to the Chinese filtering scenario. In fact, judge Magi does not advocate 
it in the sentence. Still, even if the control is post-hoc (as a consequence of flagging or a notice), the 
problem of how to decide what is inappropriate remains (see also Gunther 1992): what criteria should 
be used to label contents as inappropriate? 
 
 
12 See also note 9 above. 
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5 DIGNITY VS LIBERTY 
 
The case seems to give a hint as to how the question above should be answered: all content 
that breaches the law(s) of the land should be removed. This is not a satisfactory answer, because it 
would justify censorship of the kind currently carried out in China again. What ethical criteria should 
be used rather than focussing solely on the legal ones then? We enter here into the murky territory of 
international legal theory. The question should then be reworded as such: are there universal ethical 
criteria that businesses/governments should adopt in all circumstances and geographical/cultural 
contexts? This is another tricky issue and we do not pretend to solve it here. Rather, we will stick to 
the case and examine its implications for current debates (see also Andresani 2019). To begin with, 
the actors involved have themselves categorised the differences in the interpretation of the case as a 
trade-off between freedom of expression versus the right to privacy. According to Goggle’s CEO Eric 
Schmidt, the troubles coming from accusations of violation of privacy which have caused so many 
headaches to the company recently (i.e the Streetview, Buzz, Vividown) are due to the fact that their 
organisational culture put an emphasis on creativity. He argues that “the ‘launch first, correct later’ 
approach is vital to the ultra-creative and flexible company… (His) remedy is to protect the 
company’s freewheeling culture, while adopting a rigorous policy of owning up to mistakes and 
correcting them. That might mean more lawyers and more privacy briefings, but the engineers must 
be given space to work their software magic” (Barber and Palmer, 2010). 
Not only he labels the Vividown’s sentence as “bullshit” (verbatim), but he clearly shows 
his uneasiness with addressing issues of privacy, which if properly handled would jeopardise the 
creativity that he believes is the magic source of the company’s success. 
Here, creativity and freewheeling culture seem to stand for prioritising freedom of 
expression vis-à-vis the right to privacy. Alfredo Robledo, one of the two prosecutors in the Vividown 
case, is more explicit in construing the querelle between an emphasis on freedom of expression versus 
the human right to privacy. To the question that Google accuse them of using privacy as a pretext to 
introduce censorship, Robledo replies: 
 
The first amendment of the American constitution puts freedom of expression above any 
other statutory initiative, but the American constitution is a local statute. Question: Local? 
Yes. In Italy and Europe freedom of expression is bounded by the respect for human rights 
[literally, persons’ rights, i.e. subjective rights, G. A. and N. S.], amongst which stands out 
that to privacy. Google can’t continue to ignore this (Mucchetti, 2010). 
 
At first sight the solution to the dilemma is straightforward: the right to privacy is neither 
absolute nor necessarily inalienable. According to Spinello, “(it) is limited by other rights and moral 
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considerations because some conditions override the right to privacy” (Spinello, 2010, p. 379). 
Moreover, as Hilary Clinton stated – quoted by the American ambassador in Rome while 
expressing his disappointment for the sentence – “free Internet is an integral human right that must 
be protected in free societies”13. So, some strong negative reactions and narratives as well as outlines 
of arguments from the blogosphere (see Gilioli, 2010; Kafka, 2010; Whitcomb, 2010; also Moore 
2000) and the recognition by (some) computer and internet ethics experts such as Spinello that the 
right to privacy is a claim right subordinate to other rights14, such as freedom of expression and 
speech, seem to settle the controversy. Since the enormous literature on rights, including the one 
focusing specifically on (human) rights in relation to institutional ethics (Campbell and Miller, 2004) 
has shown that there is or should be an ethical discussion around which right(s) should prevail on 
other right(s) in specific circumstances, and since the right to privacy has been conceptualised as 
potentially subordinate to other (higher order) rights such as freedom of expression, surely Google 
must be right and the Italian judges wrong (see also Rosenberg 1999). 
First, the right to privacy has not been theorised as subordinate by all scholars, including 
computer and internet ethics experts. Deborah Johnson (2001), as Spinello (2010) acknowledges, is 
of the opinion that the current debate around the right to privacy should be reconsidered, so that it 
could be indeed reconceptualised as a Fundamental Legal Right15. The fact that she finds herself in a 
minority position surely cannot ipso facto undermine the strengths of her arguments, if ever this could 
be considered as a criterion to assess reasons (although some sociologists of knowledge might 
disagree here). Furthermore, it is necessary to consider the institutional aspect: there is a clear Atlantic 
divide regarding how to judge privacy, which has been widely discussed. In fact, Whitman (2004) 
argues that such a divide has profound historical roots: the Europeans’ focus on dignity comes from 
historical events that have shaped France and Germany which have led (the European continent) to 
 
13 DONADIO, R. (2010). 
14 See Etzioni (1999 in Norman and Jamal, p. 323): “Most people support a right to privacy. Philosophers have provided 
a number of arguments that justify a right to privacy although there are certain situations where many would agree that 
privacy rights need to be sacrified either in order to honor other rights or for the general public good”. Also Norman and 
Jamal (2006, p. 324): “with internet and the development of marketing by e-commerce, privacy issues became more 
complicated as a result of new technology”. 
15 See especially Peslak (2005); also Bowie and Jamal (2006, p. 324-326), for a Kantian justification of the right to 
privacy: “Joseph Kupfer (1987) has argued that privacy is a necessary condition for the development of autonomous 
selves […] Privacy is necessary for an efficacious self-concept and an efficacious self-concept is in turn required if one 
is to be an autonomous self” (p. 325). But they recognise also that “Despite the value of privacy to the development of an 
autonomous self-concept, we recognize that the right to privacy is not absolute […] we do not think the central moral 
issue is the importance of the information but rather who has a moral right to the information whatever the importance of 
it” (p. 326-327). Finally see Introna and Pouloudi (1999, p. 27). 
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put particular emphasis on ‘honour’ and as a consequence privacy16. This is difficult to understand in 
the USA because of a different historical trajectory (path dependence), with a consequent emphasis 
over there on a Lockean conception of freedom and the supremacy of the first amendment (read: 
freedom of expression). Indeed, the discovery of a right to privacy came quite late (Warren and 
Brandeis, 1890). It seems then that Robledo has pointed out to a real issue. But, how could such an 
institutional awareness help in the Vividown case? One route would be the one suggested by Brenkert 
(see Brenkert, 2009, also Smith 2009): assuming that Google feel so strongly about freedom of 
expression (and again their involvement in censorship in China seems to indicate otherwise), would 
then reflecting on the possibility of compromising their values be the way forward or at least the 
lesser evil in this case? True: Brenkert refers to the difficult situation Google found itself in China, 
where it had to face the hard choice between withdrawing from China and compromising its values 
by accepting Chinese authorities’ imposition of authoritarian constraints on internet freedom. 
Brenkert’s complex argument is that in real life we need indeed to make compromises when dealing 
with hard (ethical/legal) cases, such the one Google faced in China. But the fact is that it dwindled 
quite a lot in the Chinese case: at first, it did compromise its values until the case exploded in the 
(Western) media. Under huge pressure, it decided that (compromise) was not a satisfactory (for 
Google) choice and, as a consequence, it seemed to prefer to remain truer to its motto, ‘do no evil’, 
and decided instead to resolve the stand-off with Beijing by moving its operations to the more liberal 
Hong Kong, while at the same time refusing to be involved anymore in internet censorship. 
Eventually, it was clear that was a temporary solution, since it did return to (mainland) China and, in 
any case, during the time it moved to Hong Kong, filtering remained in place for searches carried out 
from mainland China (Warburton, 2010). 
The reactions so far (including the one in the FT interview of Google’s CEO mentioned 
above) seem to indicate that compromising (assuming that integrity is what Google are interested in 
this as well as in the other cases) is quite unlikely to be the option that they will consider. But, should 
they compromise or, better still, reconsider the priority they have given to freedom of expression so 
far (or, more accurately, until it seems to be convenient to their economic interests), particularly when 
compared to the right to privacy? When one reviews the literature on international institutional 
(business) law and ethics, work that focuses particularly on human rights seems to give no definitive 
answer (Beauchamp, 2010; Campbell and Miller, 2004). Even if we adopted some form of thin 
universalism, as suggested by Beauchamp (2010, see also Arnold et al 2013), for example, we could 
 
16 It is not necessary for the argument to address here the convoluted legal heritages: which national culture influenced 
the other ones first? See also Zucca (2007). 
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not avoid addressing the peculiarities of the ethical situation, which would lead consequently, and 
rightly, to a focus on the specific characteristics of the case (see also Andresani and Ward 
forthcoming). As far as protecting the weak party is concerned - and in this case there is no doubt that 
a bullied disabled boy is the weak party when compared to a powerful multinational company –, the 
right to have his privacy protected would indeed trump the right to have freedom of expression (read: 
private property) safeguarded. Accepting to constrain the freedom of expression/enterprise they 
(Google) have enjoyed so far, in order to protect the right to privacy of individuals (i.e. citizens such 
as consumers, employees, etc), would indeed be the right step towards an international debate on 
institutional diversity, aimed at reconsidering and addressing the excessive power that (large) 
companies still enjoy in the US legal system when compared to more (social) democratic jurisdictions 
(e.g. Europe), where citizens’ rights are in general protected from (violation by powerful) private as 
well as public actors. The key point here is that a stronger reliance on governance (i.e. political and 
legal regulation of businesses, particularly by relying on the political and economic clout of the EU) 
should be contemplated if required in such cases where the (economic) interests of very powerful 
actors such as Google are judged – as a result of democratic deliberation – to be subordinate to the 
(privacy) rights/interests of (much weaker) citizens. It is simply not possible to rely exclusively and 
indeed prominently on self-regulation (Pace Dignam and Galanis (2008); see especially Aglietta and 
Rebérioux, 2005). Furthermore, Google’s ‘do no evil’ motto would for sure go against any attempt 
to put aside ethical concerns as irrelevant in the economic realm17. Now, as we suggested above, this 
would not require trickier constraints such as preventive controls of contents. The effort here seems 
to be more an economic one of investing in processes (that would involve the scrutiny of contents as 
a consequence of notice of violations of privacy) that would better protect privacy. The post-hoc 
checks would only focus on violations of privacy (a very limited aspect) and could be implemented 
by considering some combination of the technical solutions discussed above and as a result of 
working in partnership with the Italian Privacy Authority. As Magi argues in the sentence18, Google 
deliberately ignored so far the concerns that l’autorità garante per la protezione dei dati personali 
had repeatedly ventilated regarding indeed privacy issues. 
This indicates in fact an institutionally specific solution to an objective moral dilemma. We 
could consider a specific hypothetical scenario as another illustration: if a Western company moves 
a branch to an Islamic country and it is faced with the request from its female employees to wear the 
 
17 See for a powerful rebuttal of the argument: Sen (1993), also Calabresi (1996); Tincani (2016); Lyon (1994); Solove 
(2002 and 2011); Thomson (1984); Richards (2015). 
18 Cf. Tribunale di Milano § 5, 52 ff. 
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veil at the workplace, leaving aside if it is required by the local laws that the company must comply 
with the request, it is the right decision to accept the request. Of course, it would be necessary to look 
at the specificities of the moral situation, but in principle there would be no particular difficulties 
involved in satisfying such a request. 
Finally, as far as the public policy implications are concerned, ethical and political issues 
must also be faced. This case shows that a coordinated legislative solution, such the GDPR at the 
European level, goes in the right direction. At the time of the first sentence legal protection (“the safe 
harbours”) for hosting intermediaries was guaranteed by the E-Commerce Directive (particularly 
articles 12-15) which was applied throughout Europe. But it did not safeguard adequately European 
citizens from privacy violations. In fact, the case has shown (and the first sentence also explicitly 
mentions) that a better legal solution for protecting privacy could and should be found also outside 
Europe, e.g. in the US19. Such a task has become even more urgent in view of the governance deficit 
(Newell, 2002) represented in the case here examined by the struggle that legitimately created laws 
(and democratically elected governments) have to endure when facing powerful (and unelected) 
private actors20. 
 
6 A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH? 
 
Our proposal then is that only the deontological structure provided by constitutional rules 
(Habermas, 1996) would not ostensibly violate the pluralistic tenets of political liberalism and 
(deliberative) democratic politics. Such structure, as advocated by a constructivist conception of 
reflexive law (Fleming, 2004 and Habermas, 1996), would instead allow a pragmatic judgment of 
stricto sensu conflicts of Fundamental (or Constitutional) Legal Rights (Alexy, 2002), and at the same 
time acknowledge their deontological justification. As we have seen in the analysis of the Vividown 
case, such a framework would indicate the following conclusion: the fundamental legal right to 
privacy is weightier than the fundamental legal right to free speech in this case. This is because of 
the internal rule of its substantive priority21. In fact, the fundamental legal right to privacy has a 
qualified priority in view of the type of considerations discussed in the case. Both fundamental legal 
 
19 Pace Bowie and Jamel (2006, p. 323): “we believe that insufficient evidence exists to propose formal government 
mandated internet regulation”. 
20 See also Lipinski (1999, p. 63): “the boundary between private information, that which is owned, and public 
information, that which is deemed available for citizens to use free from proprietary is delicate. […] This delicate balance 
is related to the character of the information itself: digital information is mutable and is not bound by physical dimensions 
it is natural that others should attempt to establish others sorts of boundaries or limits upon its use”. 
21 See Zucca (2007), who has the opposite view regarding the priority of privacy though. 
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rights express the recognition of a person’s status (Kamm, 2002) as a being who has a high level of 
inviolability (Nagel, 1995 and Habermas, 1996). But such inviolability is not absolute, and therefore 
in our view balancing is possible (Alexy, 2002). To sum up, privacy enjoys a qualified priority which 
means that in other cases (certainly not the Vividown), other considerations might well overrule that 
priority. The introduction of such qualification would therefore avoid the problems associated with 
the categorisation strategy (Scanlon, 2004; Fleming, 2004 and Habermas, 1996).  
Further research would need to analyse cases of lato sensu conflicts: e.g. the one between a 
fundamental legal right such as privacy and a collective goal such as security. In such cases, we would 
argue that privacy would enjoy again a qualified priority. This time, because of the external rule of 
substantive priority of fundamental legal rights (Habermas, 1996 and Zucca, 2007). The system of 
fundamental legal rights has, in fact, a qualified priority over any other type of considerations, which 
are external to them, such as the public interest to national security, due to their inviolability. 
Therefore, future research will have to answer this question: would a careful analysis of cases such 
the NSA warrant the overruling of the qualified priority enjoyed by the fundamental legal right to 
privacy?22 
 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In conclusion, the examination of arguments and stories in the Vividown case has shed a 
penetrating light on issues of Constitutional, IT and Business Law as well as Institutional and Internet 
ethics. The differences in the perceptions of the stakes involved do indeed reflect different and 
institutionally embedded expectations. It has been shown that, in order to uncover the issues 
surrounding the (mis)understanding of the protection of privacy, linking philosophical to institutional 
analysis would be a promising path to undertake (Habermas 1996). Attempts have been made to link 
both23 but they have been carried out by economist and/or social (political) scientists addressing 
normative issues from a social scientific point of view. The challenge is to address normative issues 
from a philosophical point of view, while drawing upon the rich evidence provided by the social 
sciences, as in the best tradition of the application of political and legal philosophy to business and 
internet ethics. A promising route for further investigation in order to widen the results of this study 
 
22 Our claim in Andresani 2016 (see also Andresani and Stamile 2016, 2017) is that the answer is negative. As a 
commentator has rightly pointed out regarding the emergency legislation rushed through by the British government for 
security reasons: “Not only […] the proposed legislation infringe our right to privacy, it […] also set a dangerous 
precedent where the government simply re-legislates every time it disagrees with a decision by the CJEU… Blanket 
surveillance needs to end. That is what the court has said” (https://bit.ly/2ZU6Dre). See also Bernal (2014). 
23 E.g. the Regulation School: see Aglietta and Rebérioux (2005); also Matten and Moon (2004); Moon et al. (2010). 
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would be to see how an expanded institutionally-focused political and legal philosophical analysis 
would contribute to the previous discussion. Luckily, there are indeed signs of such an endeavour 
recently and currently being carried out (e.g. Hartmann, 2001; Moriarty, 2005; Heath et al., 2010). 
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